This seems to settle, once and for all, the claims that the aluminum tubes were part of a nuclear program.
"Since the fall of Baghdad last spring, no evidence has emerged that Iraq planned to use the aluminum tubes in centrifuges. Despite months of searching, the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) has not found any link between the tubes and a gas centrifuge program," [David] Albright[, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)] wrote.This is why the CIA's current estimates of North Korean capabilities are being met with skepticism on many fronts.
The most damning thing one could say about an intelligence agency is not that it sometimes makes mistakes in analysis, which is inevitable, but that it refuses to admit its mistakes. When an agency cannot admit error, it cannot learn from its own missteps and is doomed to mediocrity.
In a recent publication, Stuart Cohen, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, finds no reason to acknowledge a single flaw in U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. It is the critics, he says, who have it wrong.